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Since Security Operations Centers (SOCs) were 
first implemented, they have strived to protect the 
organization and constituency they serve from all 
manner of Information Technology (IT) security 
threats. As SOCs have evolved over time to become 
as effective and efficient at this as possible, they have 
struggled with changes and upgrades to their 
foundational elements of people, processes, and 
technology in pursuit of this mission. While most 
relevant literature focuses on one challenge a SOC 
faces, or one aspect of one problem, the authors of 
this paper performed a literature review to identify 
and discuss the top current and future challenges that 
SOCs face in addition to the top current and future 
solutions to these problems. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
While much has been written on what SOCs are, 
what they do, how they function, etc., there is an 
interest in determining what problems SOCs face 
both now and in the future in addition to how they 
plan to combat these problems. 
 Most research that has been conducted in this 
area focuses either on broad descriptions and/or 
implementations of SOCs [1]–[3] or on one specific 
issue facing a SOC such as personnel and staffing 
issues [4], big data integration and analysis [5], or 
securing cloud-based SOC infrastructure [6]. This 
paper attempts to combine relevant literature and 
identify the most common current problems faced by 
a typical SOC today, problems they anticipate having 
in the future, solutions currently implemented by 
SOCs today to combat these problems, and planned 
future solutions.  
This paper will focus on both the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of issues SOCs are facing. The 
qualitative aspects are based on academic and 
industry articles for specific topics. The quantitative 
statistics will stem from survey-based statistics from 
the SANS Institute where each survey collected and 
analyzed hundreds to thousands of SOC employee 
responses from a variety of sectors to help provide a 
well-rounded understanding of the SOC community. 
In the following section, a general overview of 
what SOCs are, what they are comprised of, how they 
function, and what they are capable of will be 
discussed to give contextual understanding to the 
ensuing challenge/solution discussion. 
 
2. SOC overview 
 
Since their earliest official establishment in the 
1990s [1], there have been many terms used to 
describe  SOCs. Some of these include Security 
Operations Center (SOC), Cybersecurity Operations 
Center (CSOC),  Network Operations and Security 
Center (NOSC), and even more holistic terms such as 
a Fusion Center [1], [7]. These monikers closely 
relate to the physical SOC facility and the services it 
provides. In this paper, the term “SOC” will be used 
when referring to a security operations center while 
the term “organization” will refer to the entities the 
SOC is charged with protecting. 
Regardless of the official nomenclature chosen, 
all SOCs serve a similar purpose as shown in their 
definition. The most holistic definition for a SOC 
may be provided by SANS, according to Crowley 
and Pescatore, as “A combination of people, 
processes and technology protecting the information 
systems of an organization through: proactive design 
and configuration, ongoing monitoring of system 
state, detection of unintended actions or undesirable 
state, and minimizing damage from unwanted 
effects” [7]. In other words, SOCs operate in real-
time to help monitor and maintain the entirety of an 
enterprise’s information technology security through 
source aggregation, automatic alert 
generation/prioritization based on the data collected, 
and the ability to execute remediation solutions [1]. 
Hidden within the definition for a SOC is the 
concept of Computer Network Defense (CND). CND 
is defined as “The practice of defense against 
unauthorized activity within computer networks, 
including monitoring, detection, analysis (such as 
trend and pattern analysis), and response and 





restoration activities” [1]. Essentially, CND is what 
the SOC does and is the SOC’s overall purpose and 
objective. In pursuit of the SOC’s mission to provide 
CND, a strong foundation of people, processes, and 
technologies must be in place for a SOC to succeed. 
 
2.1. SOC foundational elements 
 
People, Processes, and Technology (PPT) are the 
foundational triad a SOC operates on. All three 
components are required for a SOC to function 
effectively while the synergy between them allows a 
SOC to function efficiently. As Zimmerman states: 
“The key to effective CND is having the people, 
process, and technology that enable the SOC to 
maintain parity with the adversary” [1].  
People are arguably the most important part of 
this triad as they are ultimately what construct a SOC 
and are often the last line of defense and 
interpretation of both data and events. Although 
processes and technology are integral to a SOC’s 
function, people are the most critical element as it is 
extremely difficult to technologically emulate human 
thought processes for analyzing and remediating 
threats [1], [3]. Vielberth, Böhm, Fichtinger, and 
Pernul state that, although automation technologies 
are necessary for SOC operations, automation is 
difficult to implement and only works under the 
correct conditions which leads to the conclusion that 
“Determining whether an alert is real requires further 
investigation by the analysts based on tacit 
knowledge” [8].  
Processes are the standardized workflows that 
SOCs and incident response teams follow to 
investigate and remediate alerts which should be  
documented in the SOC’s procedures [2]. Procedures 
often come in the form of Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) that contain the “specific 
technical processes, techniques, checklists, and 
forms” [9] used by SOC staff and are often geared 
toward junior staff such as Tier 1 personnel [1]. The 
most important aspects of processes are that they are 
both standardized and repeatable to help ensure no 
tasks are missed [10].  
Technology involves all the hardware and 
software necessary for the proper functioning of the 
SOC and the ability to provide its designated 
services. The central theme around all SOC 
technologies is that they collect, aggregate, and 
analyze data from across an enterprise’s entire 
infrastructure in addition to detection and 
prioritization of this data which later assists in 
remediation [2].  
 
2.2. SOC operation and layout 
 
SOC functionality varies widely based on several 
factors including budget, size and complexity of an 
organization, size of the SOC and services provided, 
maturity (i.e. how long the SOC has been operating), 
and where a SOC lies on the centralized vs. 
distributed spectrum [1], [7], [8]. According to the 
2019 SANS SOC survey, 37% of SOCs utilize a 
single centralized SOC followed by 25% with no 
defined architecture, and 16% that were centralized 
but regionally distributed [7]. Due to this, this paper 
will explore the functionality of single centralized 
SOCs as it is the most common type. 
 
 
Figure 1. SOC roles and escalation [1] 
 
A visualization of a single centralized SOC is 
shown in Figure 1. In this SOC configuration, data 
(e.g. logs) is collected from all IT assets across an 
organization’s entire infrastructure and stored in 
collection databases. Additionally, threat intelligence, 
such as vulnerabilities and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures of threat actors, is collected and stored in 
separate databases for correlation between what 
possible/expected threats and vulnerabilities exist 
compared to what the organization has collected and 
is currently seeing. This combined data is analyzed 
and filtered by a correlation engine to produce alerts 
that are displayed by the SIEM (Security Information 
and Event Manager). 
Through a combination of information displayed 
by the SIEM, supporting tools and processes, and 
alerts reported by the human constituency of an 
organization, alerts generated at this point are 
observed by human analysts which begin review, 
investigation, and/or remediation procedures. 
Based on the size, capabilities, requirements, and 
geographic disbursement of both a SOC and the 
organization it serves, the organizational structure of 
a SOC can vary widely. This ranges from having a 
small, five-person SOC (or less) where all staff 
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typically cross-train and serve in all functions to large 
SOCs with hundreds of people in its employ where 
staff are separated into tiers with defined 
responsibilities for their respective positions. Torres 
provides a consolidated layout of a three-tier 
structure in regard to incident remediation as follows 
[2]: 
• Tier 1 (Alert Analyst): continuous monitoring, 
triage, and remediation of incoming alerts  
• Tier 2 (Incident Responder): investigates 
complex alerts elevated from tier one personnel  
• Tier 3 (Threat Hunter): uses intelligence-led 
procedures to proactively identify and investigate 
threats before a SOC encounters them 
• SOC Manager: responsible for administrative 
procedures and acts as a communication point 
between the SOC and the organization 
Some of these tiers and capabilities can overlap 
depending on the specifics of a SOC, especially if a 
SOC is smaller in size or does not have the 
requirements or resources to implement this type of 
system [8].  
To better serve their constituency, SOCs extend 
the capabilities of tiered staff members and help 
provide additional services based on the needs of the 
organization including, but not limited to, forensic 
investigation, auditing, and training for non-security 
staff [1]. 
 
3. Current problems/challenges 
 
With an understanding of what SOCs are, how 
they operate, and who they serve, this discussion 
arrives at the problems/issues/challenges commonly 
faced by SOCs as of 2019. As with the design, 
requirements, services, organization, and staff of 
SOCs, problems vary from SOC to SOC. Therefore, 
not all SOCs will face all the problems described in 
the following sections.  
Table 1 details the top challenges faced by SOCs 
based on SANS industry surveys. Table 1 compares 
the results of the same survey conducted in 2018 and 
2019 with little change year to year for each 
individual challenge. 
 








3.1. Staffing issues 
 
Topping the list of current challenges is the lack 
of skilled staff employed by SOCs [7]. This means 
that there is both a lack of SOC staff and, 
consequently, a skill shortage in all areas necessary 
for the proper functioning of a SOC. As human 
analysts are arguably the most important portion of 
the PPT triangle, this can lead to a detrimental 
decrease in the protection, detection, and remediation 
provided by a SOC as no technology or process can 
or should completely replace them.  
The results of the SANS 2018 survey revealed 
that 61% of SOC respondents felt the lack of skilled 
staff hampered SOC operations while the 2019 
survey showed 57% felt the same [7], [11]. This 
correlates to the current need for people in the 
cybersecurity workforce as the 2020 International 
System Security Certification Consortium (ISC2) 
workforce study shows there is a shortage of 3.1 
million people in the cybersecurity field globally 
[12]. 
This challenge can be viewed on two fronts as 
described below: one is the various training and 
academic curriculums for those entering the 
cybersecurity field while the other is the 
SOC/organization itself involving recruiting, hiring, 
training, and maintaining its workforce.  
For academic curriculums, Hoffman, Burley, and 
Toregas discuss how traditional university programs 
do not match up with the time-critical nature of the 
rapidly evolving cybersecurity field, a lack of 
standardization in certificate programs, and a lack of 
networks to connect recent graduates to employers as 
major impediments in this area [4]. These reasons, 
among others, can create bottlenecks for 
organizations when seeking new people. Even if an 
organization were willing and financially able to hire 
new employees, it may be difficult to find those with 
the right skills in a timely manner. 
From the organization’s standpoint, time and 
funding must be set aside with management’s support 
for hiring, recruiting, and training. A lack of upper-
level opportunities, including managerial and 
advanced technical positions (e.g. forensics, 
penetration testing, etc.) requiring new and/or 
advanced training, can stifle the skill set of current 
employees preventing them from promotion and 
acquiring necessary knowledge [4]. 
Even when an organization finds individuals that 
are formally educated in this field, a dissonance 
exists between this education and technical 
knowledge, skills, and abilities required of the 
position [13]. This is especially true in cases of using 
detection, response, and remediation tools as these 
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are not typically part of a traditional education 
program [13].  
As Crowley and Pescatore point out, many new 
employees simply know the fundamentals of security 
theory and lack analytical and critical thinking skills 
stemming from being unable to amalgamate the 
various skillsets they have been taught [11]. It is here 
that organizations rarely have the time and/or funding 
to properly train and hone the skills of these new 
hires.  
 
3.2. Lack of automation 
 
Automation, in a general sense, refers to the 
execution of tasks without human intervention [14]. 
In SOCs, this refers to “software tools that aid 
analysts’ job and improve operational efficiency” 
[15]. Essentially, automation reduces the number of 
repetitive tasks that would normally have to be 
performed manually such as automatic ticket 
generation, system reimaging, data ingestion from 
multiple sources, and tool configuration.  
If tasks are not automated within a SOC, the more 
time it will take to manually process them thus 
reducing the effectiveness and efficiency within a 
SOC [16]. Additionally, a lack of automation 
contributes to increased analyst fatigue and a 
decreased ability to focus on more important tasks 
[15].  
A common response to mitigating problems 
caused by staff shortages described earlier is through 
automation. However, many SOCs see automation as 
a problem area as well [7].  
To this end, Table 1 shows that around 50% of 
SOCs list lack of automation as an impediment to 
making their SOC effective. Additionally, 46.3% of 
organizations report using only a low level of 
automation for key security and IR processes [14]. 
For specific automation functions, SANS reported 
that only 18% of SOCs rely on an 
automation/orchestration platform to correlate and 
analyze data for events, Indicators of Compromise 
(IoCs) and other security threat data [11]. In the same 
study, 50% of SOCs only partially automate data 
extraction and calculation with substantial manual 
effort required for reporting SOC metrics. 
There are many reasons for this lack of effective 
automation. While budget and management support 
are reported as the top reason with 61.7% of 
respondents reporting that this is a contributing 
factor, the following two, amount of staff and skill 
level, are factors in only around half of SOCs [14]. 
These issues result in a continuous predicament for 
SOCs where difficulty exists in hiring enough skilled 
staff and/or training them to accomplish “x” 
(automation in this case).  
Although automation is becoming more essential 
to a SOC’s core functions, it is important to note that 
automation should not become a replacement for 
human analysts. The purpose of automation should 
be to assist a SOC analyst in retrieving and 
processing information rather than all processes 
being completely automated. This leads to an 
additional problem where SOCs must strive for a 
balance between automated functions versus those 
analyzed by humans. While those alerts that can be 
automated with minimal impact should be 
implemented, higher-risk and more complex alerts 
should be dealt with by the analysts themselves [17].  
 
3.3. Lack of tool integration 
 
A lack of tool integration is closely tied to the 
current lack of automation in many SOCs. Integration 
is the capability for an automated platform to access, 
process, and communicate data from a variety of 
separate sources [14].  
SOCs use a variety of tools to generate, collect 
analyze, store and present vast amounts of 
information [1]. Relevant data from both non-security 
and security-specific devices, especially log data, 
must be collected and processed for the effective 
operation of a SOC. As this data comes in different 
formats potentially containing different types of data 
(or at least the data being arranged in a different 
order based on the format), it is imperative that it be 
integrated in a way that it can be read and displayed 
by the appropriate technologies [8]. 
The number of devices in an organization can 
potentially number into the millions [1]. 
Additionally, new technologies and processes are 
constantly called for in support of an expanding 
organization therefore adding to the number of 
devices.  
Without proper tool integration, SOCs will lack 
complete and detailed data from across the entirety of 
its organization [14]. Therefore, as each tool 
produces its own data, this reduces the context of an 
incoming alert and stifles an analyst’s ability to react 
as they must spend more time manually investigating 
and rendering a solution. 
Besides the 43% of organizations responding that 
a lack of tool integration is a major concern [7], 
21.3% of organizations/SOCs report not currently 
using any automation or orchestration tools while 
34% report they are currently undergoing integration 
of existing tools through in-house integration and 
orchestration efforts [14].  
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A lack of tool integration not only means a SOC 
cannot aggregate data properly from different sources 
but, consequently, that portions of the infrastructure 
are not visible [14]. This includes both not seeing the 
devices themselves and the context that this data 
provides (i.e. not only can we not collect data from 
subnet “x”, but also that we cannot see/interpret what 
those users are doing).  
One major cause of this lack of tool integration is 
a lack of integration between the SOC and Network 
Operations Center (NOC) [11]. SOCs and NOCs 
serve two separate but related functions: while the 
NOC exists to maintain an organization’s IT 
infrastructure and network communications, the SOC 
monitors the security of the same [18]. Resultingly, 
overlap with tools and functions exists between these 
two departments. While NOC tools exist from a 
maintenance and diagnostic perspective, SOC tools 
stem from a security perspective. Although both sets 
of tools can perform similar functions, they are 
typically not integrated well. 
To maintain separation of duties, it is imperative 
that these two departments remain separate. 
However, they should work together closely to help 
improve and provide a more complete picture of an 
organization’s security. Unfortunately, only around 
33% of SOCs integrate their functions with the NOC 
by either being an integral part of SOC operations or 
by being well informed and communicative of each 
other’s activities [7].  
Another issue with integration is that the myriad 
devices managed by a SOC, or at least device 
categories, come from different vendors [19]. As 
Clarke and Knake explain, security tool 
manufacturers often only want to design a product to  
solve one, narrow problem without concern for the 
larger picture of device integration as it is not a 
concern when trying to sell products [19]. This is due 
in part to SOCs lacking an understanding of their 
architectural needs and/or their desire to purchase 
tools that appear to be the most current solution to an 
issue which, resultingly, cause SOCs to increase their 
capability to react to some security problems but at 
the cost of the capability to resolve the more core 
issue of device integration [19]. 
 
4. Anticipated problems/challenges  
 
As we move beyond 2019, there is no way to 
predict with absolute certainty what the future will 
hold. However, the types of issues SOCs will face in 
the coming years can be foreseen to some degree. 
With that, the issues described in the previous current 
problems/challenges section can easily transfer here 
as the speed at which SOCs and the entire security 
community remediate these issues depends on a 
variety of factors including money, time, and staffing 
levels.  
Referring to Figure 2, we can see the top areas 
SOCs plan to focus future monetary investment in. 
Although this can be viewed as future solutions to 
current problems, it provides insight into what the 
future problems of SOCs will be.  
 
 
Figure 2. Future SOC investments [20] 
 
4.1. Leveraging machine learning and big 
data 
 
Machine learning is a derivative of the broader 
study of artificial intelligence [21]. According to 
Tantawy, this up-and-coming solution to many SOC 
problems incorporates algorithms to gather, process, 
and generalize both historical and current data for a 
SOC in order to learn from this over time [21]. By 
information mining, pattern correlation, and drawing 
inferences from this processed data, machine learning 
can predict, to some degree, future outcomes and 
assist SOC analysists in detecting and reacting to 
threats more quickly [21].  
With machine learning, not only are the detection 
and response capabilities of a SOC automated more 
effectively and efficiently, the learning aspect is as 
well [21]. This represents a developing trend in 
cybersecurity with the convergence of data science 
and analytics.  
Large amounts of unstructured data fed to a 
machine learning solution is a major component of  
machine learning effectiveness [5]. Although 
comprehensive big data can aid in machine learning, 
it has uses by itself such as being fed into log 
aggregation tools like the Elasticsearch, Logstash, 
and Kibana (ELK) platform or Splunk which help 
provide correlation, visualization, and therefore 
meaning to this seemingly limitless, unfiltered data. 
As shown in Figure 2, almost a quarter of all 
SOCs predict they will invest in big data in the near 
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future. As of 2018, almost 52% of SOCs reported 
using AI/machine learning in some capacity [11] 
which increased from just under 40% from the 
previous year [22]. However, SOCs reported only a 
34% satisfaction rating with the ability for machine 
learning to detect the occurrence of a threat in their 
organization in 2019 [7] which decreased from a 62% 
satisfaction rating for all machine learning 
capabilities from the previous year [10]. Overall, as 
machine learning becomes implemented to a greater 
degree, the satisfaction rating seems to decrease.  
Several reasons help explain these satisfaction 
ratings, but the overarching cause is that the vendor-
assured value of machine learning and big data are 
currently exaggerated [7]. With assertions that 
machine learning will eventually help with staffing 
problems, it requires skilled people to install, 
configure, and tune this technology as respondents in 
the 2019 SOC survey cited frequent false positives 
occurring as a result of implementing machine 
learning in their SOC [7].  
Another source of dissatisfaction involves the 
previously discussed issues of integrated tools, 
visibility, and the ability to perform baselining [7]. 
For machine learning to be effective, a SOC must 
have visibility into their entire organization to gather 
data for machine learning to use and learn from. 
Without proper and accurate data, the conclusions 
derived by machine learning will remain 
unsatisfactory. 
 
4.2. MSSP outsourcing 
 
Although some SOCs have already begun 
outsourcing some or all aspects of their capabilities to 
Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs), this 
will likely become more widespread in the future as 
the necessity for it will become more apparent with 
staff, skill, and resource shortages for the foreseeable 
future. According to a 2020 survey conducted by 
SANS concerning the use of external services, 23.5% 
of organizations reported they will maintain the same 
level of use for MSSP services as the previous year 
while 21.6% planned to increase the use of MSSPs 
by the end of 2021 [13]. 
MSSPs can be defined as paid entities that 
function as full-fledged SOCs completely external to 
an organization [1]. More specifically, MSSPs 
function similarly to a Software as a Service (SaaS) 
model even so far as to consider them a SOC as a 
Service (SOCaaS) in that they provide information 
security assurance and event management via log 
collection from both the SOC/infrastructure and their 
own cloud platform to help provide proactive and 
reactive defense [23].  
When a lack of staff, specialized skills, and other 
resources exists for SOC operations, MSSPs are often 
considered and used to augment SOC capabilities as 
they can fill staffing and skill shortages required for 
in-house SOC functions [11]. Outsourcing SOC 
functionality in this way can allow a SOC to devote 
more time and resources to education/training of 
personnel they choose to keep.  
With the benefits of MSSP use also come several 
challenges [11]. Outsourcing and the use of MSSPs 
are least likely to be successful when the provider 
must have a thorough understanding of business 
processes and/or active modification of internal 
systems is required [11]. A great deal of trust is also 
required between the organization/SOC and the 
MSSP as the MSSP requires knowledge of 
confidential business secrets that organizations are 
normally reluctant to provide to external parties to 
function effectively [11]. 
As mentioned previously for internal-only SOCs, 
device integration is a current and ongoing concern 
[14]. Even if a SOC uses different vendors for 
security and IT products that do not integrate well, 
they at least have the knowledge of what systems 
they have purchased. With an MSSP, an 
understanding of both the SOC’s and the MSSP’s 
technology and processes must be acquired and 
configured accordingly [24]. This can lead to a 
lengthy integration timeline (assuming it is 
successful) of typically six to nine months [7]. 
Although MSSPs may be a better option for some 
SOCs in the long run, SOCs may not be comfortable 
with the time and effort required in combination with 
the needed effectiveness of monitoring and detection. 
 
4.3. Cloud-based infrastructures 
 
Regardless of the use of MSSPs, 
organizations/SOCs are moving towards using cloud-
based solutions [24]. An organization building and 
maintaining their own data centers for complete 
ownership of all equipment and technology can be an 
expensive proposition. As organizational 
requirements for new technologies to meet business 
needs is ever-growing, the border between on-
premises environments and cloud infrastructure is 
beginning to erode. 
74.2% of organizations currently use a mix of 
cloud and on-premise solutions for their 
infrastructure while 3% of organizations report using 
a cloud-only infrastructure for their operations [20]. 
This means that 19% use an on-premises only 
solution while over 77% of organizations use the 
cloud in some capacity. According to the SANS 2019 
Cloud Security Survey, most organizations (32.5%) 
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use two to three cloud service  providers [25]. With 
this continuing trend, respondents of the 2019 SOC 
survey show that the implementation of both informal 
ad hoc and single centralized SOCs are declining 
while the preference for both distributed and cloud-
based SOCs is increasing [7].  
With cloud-based providers, three organizations 
exist: the SOC using the services of the provider, the 
provider itself, and all other third parties affiliated 
with the SOC and/or the cloud provider. As 
integration will be required, this can result in a 
complex, heterogeneous technical coordination 
between all parties as there can be a significant lack 
of interoperability between both the overall 
infrastructure and security tools used by all parties 
[6]. 54.8% of SOCs report this lack of integration 
between security tools and the cloud as their top 
concern [20] while 28.2% of SOCs report a lack of 
employee skill/training with using public cloud 
services as their top realized issue [25]. 
Furthermore, just like an on-premises only 
solution, use of cloud resources leads to visibility 
issues from a lack of system/device integration [26]. 
For instance, with Amazon Web Services (AWS), 
while the customer is responsible for security in the 
cloud (i.e. their assets), AWS is responsible for 
security of the cloud itself [27]. For a SOC to be 
assured that both fronts are protected, this requires a 
great deal of coordination, integration, and 
configuration of both parties in addition to a high 
amount of trust as cloud providers may not fully 
disclose security vulnerabilities affecting themselves, 
and therefore the SOC, as they should. 
Lastly, using cloud-based services leads to an 
expanded attack surface and should force a SOC to 
consider where threats may emerge from [28]. In 
addition to data being transferred between a 
SOC/organization, cloud systems are ultimately 
based on hardware and operating systems meaning 
they have inherent vulnerabilities just like traditional 
IT and security devices [28]. 
 
5. Current solutions 
 
Some of the problems described in the previous 
section are solutions in and of themselves such as 
automation, using machine learning, MSSPs, and 
moving infrastructure into the cloud. As this 
discussion moves from current/future problems to 
current/future solutions, we will discuss how some of 
the most important issues for SOCs can be mitigated 
or resolved. Comparing Table 1 to Figure 2, we can 
see a comparison between SOC’s overall concerns 
and areas of future investment. From this 
information, some of the top areas for current and 
future solutions can be seen.  
 
5.1. Student and employee training 
 
The overarching principle behind growing a 
skilled workforce for the cybersecurity field, and 
therefore qualified staff for a SOC, is a holistic 
approach to both education and training [4]. This 
involves the convergence of government, industry, 
and academic parties to communicate, identify, and 
define what education and training is necessary  
when compared against the complex and ever-
evolving world of cybersecurity [4]. 
One such partnership is the National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Education (NICE) framework which 
helps define and map required cybersecurity 
knowledge and skills for new entrants to the field 
thereby helping to address needed education and 
workforce challenges [29]. Universities can use this 
framework to better define programs, while 
employers can create applicable training programs, 
and policymakers can create laws and standards to 
better facilitate this convergence effort. Additionally, 
programs such as the DoD Cyber Scholarship 
Program and the National Science Foundation’s 
Scholarship for Service enable better collaboration 
between government-driven support and focus, 
academic education, and industry-based skill 
refinement through cybersecurity conference 
attendance and internship opportunities [30], [31].  
Based on insight and guidance provided from 
frameworks like NICE, two- and four-year academic 
institutions educating new entrants to the 
cybersecurity field should make the effort to merge 
cybersecurity education with their diverse range of 
schools and departments (e.g. business, engineering, 
science, etc.), adapt to the field and provide job-
relevant skills, and take advantage of contemporary 
technological developments [4]. For example, Cyber 
Bit’s Cyber Range mimics a SOC in a virtual 
environment for students thereby enabling them to 
train and respond to simulated alerts and incidents as 
if they were working in an actual SOC [32]. 
Solutions like Cyber Range allows students to not 
only integrate classroom instruction with real, 
marketable experience in a training environment, but 
also take a real-time, proactive approach to applied 
learning and problem solving instead of traditional 
reactive/historical assignments. 
For employee training, especially for new hires, 
initial training should be a top priority that is 
included in an organization’s processes [8]. Much of 
this should be focused on foundational skills acquired 
through documentation review and on-the-job 
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experience via observation and supervised tasking. 
For a SOC, this could mean forming a new employee 
pipeline where the person starts in a tier one position 
to become familiar with the technologies used, the 
overall environment, and issues typically seen in that 
SOC followed by periodic training. From here, as 
new hires gain experience and proficiency, they can 
move on to receive additional training in more 
specific areas of SOC operations.  
 
5.2. Automation improvements 
 
As most SOCs are suffering from the lack of 
skilled staff combined with large and ever-growing 
pools of data to analyze, they are constantly looking 
for new ways to automate tasks and implement 
orchestration and device/operations integration [8]. 
For a SOC to achieve effective and thorough 
monitoring and analysis, they must strive to automate 
to the largest extent possible without removing 
people entirely from the protection, detection, and 
remediation processes [1]. 
One relatively new and novel way of 
accomplishing this is with Dorkbot developed by the 
University of Texas at Austin which is currently used 
by over 2.350 educational institutions from 205 
countries [33]. Dorkbot “automates the discovery and 
verification of web application vulnerabilities across 
entire domains at scale” and hunts for both 
uncommon and common web-based vulnerabilities 
such as cross-site scripting, local/remote file 
inclusion, operating system injection, and SQL 
injections by leveraging the power of publicly 
available sources such as the Google Hacking 
Database [33], [34]. Dorkbot was developed entirely 
in-house and is distributed freely to all academic 
institutions to include the source code if an institution 
wishes to deploy it locally. While the focus is toward 
academia, several state agencies in Texas use 
Dorkbot as well. The continued effort to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of Dorkbot has resulted 
from over 6,000 verified vulnerabilities reported in 
2017 to over 26,000 in 2018 [34]. 
Other more common tools for automating aspects 
of a SOC’s operations include log aggregation and 
big data analysis tools such as Splunk, ELK, and 
Sumo Logic [5]. With log aggregation tools like 
these, the process of analysts having to either 
manually parse logs from myriad devices of different 
types or parse these logs with relatively simplistic 
search mechanisms like grep are dramatically 
reduced. In addition to aggregating various log and 
data sources from across a SOC’s environment, the 
ingestion of threat intelligence from sources internal 
and external to the SOC allow for the effective 
correlation of pertinent information to proactively 
determine the source of threats and how to respond to 
them more effectively and efficiently.  
The combination and use of these various 
orchestration/automation processes and technologies 
have greatly aided SOCs, albeit with the challenges 
described earlier, in combating the truly foundational 
issues of time, money, and lack of skilled personnel. 
The challenge for SOCs and their respective 
management is to plan for the effective 
implementation and use of these tools and processes, 
decide on what is most appropriate for their 
operations, and dedicate resources towards fully 
integrating them. 
 
6. Future solutions  
 
As with the challenges described earlier 
(automation, MSSPS, cloud integration), we can see 
some of the solutions that SOCs may implement out 
of desire and/or necessity as we move beyond 2019. 
The current/future solutions described here are 
interchangeable to an extent. Although the solutions 
described in the next section are in use to some 
degree currently, they are not as well defined and/or 
implemented as the current solutions described 
previously.  
 
6.1. Development security operations 
 
A developing trend for organizations to undertake 
and for SOCs to monitor and integrate into their 
security solutions is that of Development Security 
Operations (DevSecOps) which stems from 
Development Operations (DevOps) [35].  
DevOps strives to produce quality code through a 
streamlined process that incorporates automated 
testing on a continuous development and deployment 
cycle [36]. While there are advantages to producing 
code in this manner, security is mostly an 
afterthought as DevOps is often outsourced and/or 
deployed in the cloud through an Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) or Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
implementation thereby reducing the control and 
visibility that the parent organization has with respect 
to both the code itself and the external infrastructure 
it is created on [37]. 
DevSecOps functions as an extension of the 
Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) that seeks 
to change the process that DevOps uses by enhancing 
the security of both the automation processes and the 
final code [38]. DevSecOps functions via continuous 
collaboration among development, IT operations, and 
information security teams with all three involved in 
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the continuous development and deployment cycle 
[28]. By integrating security controls and into the 
DevOps cycle, security tasks related to code building, 
such as security checking and testing, can be 
automated thus leading to secure code that does not 
interfere with the continuous nature of software 
development and deployment [36].  
This new focus in software construction has led to 
the implementation of Continuous Integration and 
Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) pipelines [35]. With a 
CI/CD pipeline, often offered by major cloud and 
external service providers such as Amazon Web 
Services, Microsoft, and Atlassian, scalable 
continuous security becomes part of this cycle as well 
through various automated testing processes such as 
both static (tests owned and/or imported code) and 
dynamic code analysis (tests code externally while in 
a running state as an attacker would) [38].  
While CI/CD pipelines add automated security 
verification and testing to code, they also create logs 
of every step in the process [36]. Logging in this way 
helps create continuous, verifiable feedback that can 
be ingested and analyzed by SOC tools to check for 
security issues both during development and after 
deployment. Combined with data gathered from 
threat intelligence sources, this can alert the SOC to 
the most up to date vulnerabilities created as a result 
of its constituency’s software development whether 
internal or external to the organization. 
 
6.2. Platform consolidation 
 
Combining the previously discussed concepts of 
orchestration/automation, device integration, and the 
expanding nature of organizations (especially in the 
cloud), there is a prediction that the security tools 
used by SOCs will be consolidated under a handful of 
platform developers [19].  
A security platform is the combination of four 
separate types of components: devices that sense, 
devices that understand and filter what the sensors 
collect, devices that make decisions based on the 
filtered data, and devices that carry out actions based 
on what the decision-making devices decide [19]. 
These components combined in this manner will 
allow SOCs to have all the features and capabilities 
of multiple tools from multiple vendors without the 
configuration and integration overhead.  
Creating a platform does not mean that platform 
manufacturers will be required to buy out smaller 
companies, but rather that they integrate existing 
tools into the single platform they develop. Clarke 
and Knake provide an example of this when they 
describe how vendor A can have the sensing and 
actuating components of a platform installed in an 
organization’s infrastructure while the sense- and 
decision-making devices belonged to vendor B 
housed in their separate infrastructure. Here, vendor 
B would be able to automatically pull information 
gathered by the sensors, process it, and send the 
decision back to the actuating devices owned by 
vendor A [19]. 
While the security platform concept itself relates 
more to the future of the cybersecurity industry, this 
would have tremendous benefits for SOCs as they 
would not have to coordinate and integrate with 
multiple vendors. A solution sometimes proposed by 
SOCs in response to this is for them to make their 
own tools. This is a massive undertaking that requires 
tremendous amounts of time, money, and expertise 
which many SOCs do not have as only 22.7% of 
SOCs report using Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs) and dashboards developed entirely 




SOCs, in their mission to provide CND for an 
organization through protection, detection, 
investigation, and remediation of alerts and incidents, 
rely on a combination of people, processes, and 
technology. Within each of these foundational 
components, there exists many challenges in 
achieving effective and efficient SOC operations. 
While SOCs are struggling through the growing pains 
of resolving these issues, there exists a constant 
stream of solutions from the motivation, ingenuity, 
and dedication of the most important aspect of a 
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